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THE DISCRETE, THE RELATIONAL,
THE SELFISH, AND THE SOCIETAL:
ELEMENTS PRESENT IN ALL
TRANSACTIONS
ChristineLiyanto'

I. INTRODUCTION

Is the heart of the modem contract individual self-interest, or is it
society? Are modem contractual relations more like discrete contracts or
relational contracts?
Modem contracts are becoming increasingly relational, but that does
not mean that they are shedding their discrete' characteristics. The modem
contractual relationship requires elements from both the discrete model of
contracts, which runs strongly on a principle of individual self-interest, and
the primitive relational model of contracts, which is heavily societyoriented. In other words, modem contracts have both discrete and
relational characteristics, and the core of modem contractual relations is
built upon both self-interest and society.
This article will examine (1) the characteristics of discrete contracts
and their association with a goal of self-interest, (2) the characteristics of
primitive relational contracts and their association with a focus on society,
and (3) how all transactions contain elements from both of those
contractual models, reflecting both a goal of self-interest and a focus on
society.

* J.D. Candidate, University of California, Hastings College of the Law, 2008; Bachelor of Arts,
Philosophy, Minor in Political Science, Stanford University, 2005.
1. IAN R. MACNEIL. THE NEW SOCIAL CONTRACT 10 (Yale University Press 1980).
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II. THE PURELY DISCRETE MODEL

A. QUALITIES OF THE PURELY DISCRETE CONTRACT
Discrete contracts are those "in which no relation exists between the
parties apart from the simple exchange of goods."2 In contrasting the traits
of purely discrete contracts against primitive relational contracts3 (an
example of pure relational transactions), Ian R. Macneil addresses the
following eleven factors: (1) "personal relations," (2) "numbers," (3),
"measurement and specificity," (4) "sources of contractual solidarity," (5)
"commencement, duration, and termination," (6) "planning," (7) "future
cooperation," (8) "sharing and dividing benefits and burdens," (9)
"obligations," (10) "transferability," and (11) "attitudes."4 This section will
focus on five of these factors: personal relations, measurement and
specificity, sources of contractual solidarity, future cooperation, and
attitudes.
1. Personal Relations
In the purely discrete contract personal relations are extremely
limited.5 "Communications in discrete transactions are limited, linguistic,
and if of any length, formal."6 The relations in discrete contracts are so
limited because the aim of the transaction is simply a one-shot economic
exchange, for example, buying gasoline for cash at a self-service station.7
2. Measurement and Specificity
Discrete transactions are "carefully measured and specified." 8 They
are transactions that Macneil characterizes as "the paradigm of measured
reciprocal exchange." 9 Such particular specificity and measurement makes
sense because of the character of discrete transactions as one-shot
economic exchanges, with limited personal relations.
2. Id.
3. In discussing pure relational contracts or transactions, this paper focuses on Macneil's
description of "primitive contractual relations" as an example of pure relational transactions.
4. MACNEIL,supra note 1,at 13-17.
5. Id.at13.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id at 14.
9. Id.
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3. Sources of Contractual Solidarity
In discrete transactions, there are barely any mechanisms in play that
promote and reinforce contractual solidarity.1 ° In other words, there are
very few mechanisms that "hold the parties together enough so that they
will not kill and steal in preference to exchanging."'" As Macneil states:
In the discrete transaction, apart from the immediate gains each party
sees in exchanging, no contractual solidarity exists except for that
external god providing social stability, enforcement of promises, and
other basic requirements. Within these rigid confines the 2parties are
free to maximize individual utilities to their hearts' content.'
Since the discrete transaction is not based on a continuing relationship
but is rather marked by a short 3 and fleeting relationship, that there is
minimal promotion of contractual is not inconceivable.
4. Future Cooperation
Discrete transactions involve almost no future cooperation. 4 This is
because "[e]ach party simply produces either the commodity or the money
at the time and place promised."' 5 This factor, like the other factors
described regarding purely discrete transactions, is very much in line with
the economically calculated and narrow nature of the discrete exchange.
5. Attitudes
There is a particular set of attitudes associated with the parties in a
discrete transaction.' 6 One of these attitudes deals with a very "sharp and
conscious individualistic focus."' 7 That is, there is a "focus on the
divisiveness and selfishness inherent in exchange, rather than on its
cohesive and cooperative aspects."' 8 Related to this attitude is the idea that
parties in a discrete exchange have no sense of "unity" in their perception

10.
11.
12.
13
14.
15.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.at 15.
Id.at 16.
Id.

at 18.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id.
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of the exchange between them.' 9 "[I]n the discrete transaction there is no
sense of unity whatsoever; it is a case of me and him, in that order, and
strangers evermore. 2 0
The notion of time is involved in another attitude of discrete
transaction participants. 2' Discrete transaction participants deal with all
future events in the present, by making present plans - with extreme
what will happen in the future, also known as
precision - 2for
"presentiating. 2 Accordingly, because of such precision in planning for
the future "as if it were in the present," there is also an attitude among
discrete transaction participants that they are not supposed to run into any
"trouble" 23 in carrying out a contractual exchange because "every
conceivable contingency is entirely planned. 2 4
B. BASIS OF THE PURELY DISCRETE TRANSACTION

The basis of the discrete contract is well illustrated by the classical
contract theory model of contract. According to the classical contract
theorist, the basis of contract is self-interest. It is a perspective in which
contracts are a game of "one-shot/one exchange transactions, 25 and where
the players are "self-interested, rational contracting parties [who have] the
single objective of maximizing their wealth. 26 In other words, parties
come together and make contracts with each other in order to gain
something -

some kind of a benefit -

for each of themselves. That is,

each party is not interested in obtaining a benefit for anyone other than
himself, except for perhaps the benefit to the party he is contracting with
(but the first party's interest in the second party's benefit is only insofar as
it will secure the first party's own benefit).
The aims of self-interest are furthered by identifying contracts under
this theory as focusing on the individual, and "assume[ing] that parties
make contracts in an individually autonomous way,"2 7 as Alice Belcher has
characterized. Belcher further adds that, "In classical contract law, the

19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 19.
Id.
Id.
Id.

25. Mary Keyes & Kylie Bums, Contract and the Family: Whither Intention?, 26 MELB. U. L.
REv. 577, 585 (2002), availableat http://kirra.austlii.edu.au/au/joumals/MULR/2002/30.html.
26. Id.
27. Alice Belcher, A Feminist Perspective on Contract Theories from Law and Economics, 8
FEMINIST LEGAL STUDIES 29, 35 (2000).
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'
contract itself signifies a strong, precise, assertive and rational choice."28
The core of contract being self-interest, it follows that under classical
contract theory, the framework for contract is "private autonomy ' 29 and the
freedom to contract as one individually and self-interestedly chooses. As
Belcher writes, under the classical theory of contract, "[p]arties should be
as free as possible to make agreements on their own terms without
from the courts and their agreements should be enforced by the
interference
30
courts.

The language of classical contract theory, under which the root of
contractual transactions is self-interest, is thus an "agent-centered"
It is a theory of contract where the justifications for
language.'
enforcement are, accordingly, agent-centered justifications. 32 As Gillian
Hadfield writes, "It is agent-centered contract logic that responds, 'we
enforce this obligation because you chose to be obligated.' ' 33 And one
chooses to be obligated because of one's self-interested goals. That is, one
chooses to enter into an agreement in order to fulfill a desire to obtain an
individual right - a right created by one's very entrance into the
agreement:
In this view, law does not judge the formation, performance, or breach
of a contract on the basis of external juristic values; law acts only as a
surrogate for the values created by the parties themselves. ... Law
aims exclusively to give effect to the arrangements and to protect the
interests voluntarily created by contracting parties.34
Hence, the basis of the discrete contract, following the example of the
classical model of contract, is a kind selfishness and self-interest that stands
in contrast with the elements - and corresponding basis - of the purely
relational model of contract, described in the next section.
III. THE PURELY RELATIONAL MODEL

A. QUALITIES OF THE PURELY RELATIONAL CONTRACT
In discussing the nature of purely relational contracts, Macneil

28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Gillian K. Hadfield, An Expressive Theory of Contract: From Feminist Dilemmas to a
Reconceptualizationof Rational Choice in Contract Law, 146 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1235, 1252 (1998).
32. Id.
33. Id. at 1254.
34. Id. at 1261-62.
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describes what he calls "primitive contractual relations,"3 5 which serve as a
theoretical paradigm of purely relational transactions. Such relational
transactions, unlike discrete transactions, do not have a purely
individualistic focus. Instead, they are society oriented and community
driven. Like discrete transactions, the characteristics of purely relational
transactions (exampled by primitive contractual relations) can be assessed
with respect to the following categories: personal relations, measurement
and specificity, sources of contractual solidarity, future cooperation, and
attitudes.
1. Personal Relations
While personal relations in discrete transactions are extremely limited,
personal relations are a key component of relational transactions.36
Participants in primitive contractual relations, or relational transactions,
"derive complex personal noneconomic satisfactions and engage in social
exchange, as well as what an outside observer might call economic
exchange."37 Personal relations, thus, are a defining aspect of purely
relational contracts.
2. Measurement and Specificity
As previously articulated, discrete transactions are meticulously
measured, specified exchanges. Relational transactions, on the other hand,
are far less specified:
In primitive contractual relations the most important subjects of what
an outsider might call economic exchanges will have no measurable
monetary market values. Amounts and relative values are likely to be
vague. And the remainder of the relation and obligations arising from
it are likely to be very diffuse, and hence unmeasurable.38
3. Sources of Contractual Solidarity
Unlike the theoretical paradigm of purely discrete transactions, under
the model of purely relational transactions there exist numerous

35.

MACNEIL, supra note

36. Id. at 13.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 14.

1,at 11.
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reinforcements that promote contractual solidarity between parties.39 There
is a continuing "interdependence" between parties because relational
transactions are all about "continuous social relation[s]," as articulated by
Marshall Sahlins.4 ° In other words, the relations between parties, and
between each party and society as a whole, largely govern exchange in the
relational transaction model.
4. Future Cooperation
Future cooperation is much more relevant in the relational transaction
context than in the discrete transaction context. 41 This can be explained by
the fact that adjustment in the relations between parties is an essential
characteristic of the relationship itself.42 As Macneil characterizes in
discussing relational transactions (as illustrated by primitive contractual
relations), "[A]s the future unfolds, adjustments will have to be made to
deal with new circumstances," since the transaction is not a rigidly
measurable, readily calculable, singular economic transaction. 4' As such,
continued cooperation is crucial.
5. Attitudes
Just as there is a particular set of attitudes prevalent among discrete
transaction participants, so, too, exists a collection of attitudes that are
aligned with parties in the relational model of transactions. 44 While
discrete transactions maintain an individualistic focus, relational
transactions focus on group gains, cohesiveness, and cooperation. 45 And
while discrete transaction participants lack a sense of unity, those involved
in relational transactions have a very strong sense of unity.46 Such a
pronounced sense of unity enables participants in the purely relational
transaction model to more readily "view their individual interests as
coextensive with the interests of the overall relation., 47 In other words,
instead of having an attitude that declares, "I want that from you, and you
want this from me," as is the case under the discrete transactional model,
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.

Id.
Id. at 14-15.
Id. at 16.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 18.
ld.
Id.
Id.
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the mantra in the realm of purely relational transactions goes something
more like, "We share the same interests, therefore we should work together
to benefit from our mutual interests. 4 8
Another attitude, as discussed previously regarding parties to discrete
transactions, relates to the idea of time. Unlike parties to discrete
transactions, who take great pains to account and plan for all details of a
transaction - present and future - well in advance, parties to purely
relational transactions, or primitive contractual relations, exercise far less
precision in planning, which "leave[s] the future where it is; waiting to
happen. 4 9 Naturally flowing from this attitude is an acceptance among
primitive relational transaction participants that getting into trouble - or
running into problems that were not immediately accounted for at the
initiation of the relationship - is "a normal aspect of life."5 °
B. BASIS OF THE PURELY RELATIONAL TRANSACTION

Relational contract theory is in opposition to the classical theory of
contract, the latter's principles, again, being associated with discrete
contract model principles. While the classical theory of contract is
centered on the individual, where the crux of contract is the goal of selfinterest, under the relational theory of contract, the goal is cooperation i.e., an interest in working with others - and the center is society. As
Macneil writes, "The fundamental root, the base, of contract is society."51
As he further elaborates:
Never has contract occurred without society; never will it occur without
society; and never52can its functioning be understood isolated from its
particular society.
Thus, the goal of contract, under this assessment of relational contract
theory, is cooperation, which fosters relationships, and which produces
good for a society as a whole. The primary interests at stake are not the
interests of the individual, but the interests of society, under this theory of
contract. Contract law under relational contract theory is not focused on
individual wealth and individual welfare, but rather social wealth and
social welfare. 3

48. See Id.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.

Id. at 19.
Id.
Id. at 1.
Id. at 1-2.
Hadfield, supra note 31.

Spring 2008]

TRANSACTIONAL ELEMENTS

IV. DISCRETE AND RELATIONAL QUALITIES ARE NOT MUTUALLY
EXCLUSIVE

Despite their stark differences, and despite what has been suggested
by certain theories of contract, the components of the discrete and
relational transactional models are not mutually exclusive. If elements
associated with one of the two models is detected in a transaction, it does
not mean that there cannot coexist any elements from the other model,
within the same transaction. This section will first describe why in
practice, no transaction can be purely discrete nor purely relational, as
defined by their respective conceptual paradigms, because characteristics
from both are readily identifiable in every transaction. Next, this section
will show how the particular goals, or bases, associated with the models of
pure discrete transactions and pure relational transactions - goals of selfinterest and societal cooperation, respectively - are also identifiable in
every transaction.
A. CHARACTERISTICS OF THE DISCRETE AND THE RELATIONAL ARE
PRESENT INALL TRANSACTIONS
The concepts of the purely discrete transaction and the purely
relational transaction are simply that - just concepts.
They are
illustrations, or "constructs,"54 of extreme models of a contractual
relationship. For example, in discussing discrete transactions, Macneil
states that they are not supposed to get into trouble "ifthe concept is carried
'
to its extreme[.]" 55
(Emphasis added.) In other words, both the purely
discrete transaction and the purely relational transaction are "fictional
constructs."56 As Macneil characterizes:
The description of the primitive contractual relation is a highly
generalized and therefore largely fictional summary of anthropological

studies of widely disparate primitive communities, widely disparate
both in space and in time. Even more important, at the
other end of the
57
spectrum the discrete transaction is entirely fictional.
Hence, in practice outside of the theoretical world of fictional
constructs, it is impossible to have a purely discrete transaction, and just as
impossible to have a purely relational transaction. This article previously
distinguished purely discrete transactions from purely relational
54. MACNEIL, supranote 1, at 11.

55. Id.
at 19.
56. Id.
at 11.
57. Id.
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transactions based on Macneil's categories of (1) personal relations, (2)
measurement and specificity, (3) sources of contractual solidarity, (4)
future cooperation, and (5) attitudes. However, using these categories as a
starting point, it is evident that characteristics from both the pure discrete
transactional model and the pure relational model are found in all
transactions.
1. The Impossibility of a Purely Discrete Transaction: Personal
Relations and Future Cooperation
It is impossible in practice to have a purely discrete contract because
every contract involves personal relations, which are heralded by the purely
relational model. As Macneil states, "every contract ...involves relations
apart from the exchange of goods itself."5 8 Even the transaction of
neoclassical microeconomics, a theoretical transaction that Macneil labels
as the paradigm of the discrete contract, involves such relations. 59 "Since
exchange in any meaningful economic sense is impossible outside a
society, even the purest discrete model necessarily does postulate a social
Even in the most discrete transactions, in the most
matrix.""
"instantaneous ' 61 transactions, there is a need for relational, social
elements: "the modem contractual relation does not become simply a
bunch of discrete transactions., 62 As Macneil further points out, "the very
complexity of modem technology calls for processes and structures tying
even the most specific and measured exchanges into ongoing relational
patterns. 63
Another reason for why we cannot have a transaction that is purely
discrete is that even in the most precise and immediate exchanges, like the
example of paying for gas at the self-serve gas pump, there will always be
expectations about the future, namely, "expectations that future exchange
will occur,"' i.e., the kind of expectations represented by the relational
transactional model. Indeed, Macneil notes that "the existence of an
ongoing market for a product creates, without hierarchical command,
expectations that production for that market may be worthwhile." 5
Furthermore, "[s]uch markets remain among our most important relational
exchange-projectors, even though the relational web they create may be
58
59.
60.
61
62.
63.
64
65.

Id. at 10.
Id.
Id. at 11.
Id. at 15.
Id. at 22.
Id.
Id. at 8.
Id.
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highly impersonal. 66 In other words, even in a straightforward exchange
of money for a particular over-the-counter product, a relational web is
created by way of the expectations that are promoted for the production of
that product in its particular market. The one-shot exchange, thus, does
involve personal relations and expectations about the future after all.
2. The Impossibility of a Purely Relational Transaction: Measurement
and Specificity
Just as it is impossible to have a purely discrete transaction, it is also
impossible to have a purely relational transaction. To begin with, in all
transactions, there is at least some form of calculation involved. It is just
that the calculation may be present in a different manner.6 7 For example,
with relational transactions, "calculation in the self-interest sense may be
present, but calculation in the reckoning sense is muted.' 6 As Macneil
points out, "modem technology demands extremely high levels of
specification of products and services, and hence immense specificity is
required in modem relational exchange."6 9 Hence, there is always some
level of measurement and specificity in all transactions, which again, is a
hallmark of discrete transactions.
3. Attitudes: Incorporating Attitudes Associated with Both the
Discrete and Relational Paradigms
Three categories of attitudes - a sense of unity, an attitude about
future planning, and an attitude regarding trouble - are manifested in all
transactions in a way that incorporates both discrete and relational views.
Aligned with the relational transactional model, there is something of a
sense of unity in all transactions, though it may be present in varying
degrees, depending on the nature of the transaction. As previously
described, even in the straightforward transaction involving the purchase of
a particular item in a store, there is an aspect of unity between the customer
and the store. If the customer does not like the product, he may have to
return to the store for a refund or a product exchange. In the alternative, if
he does approve of the product, he will likely continue to frequent that
store in the future for other products and purchases. Nonetheless, the
unifying element is still limited, as the discrete model would emphasize.
66.
67
68.
69.

Id.
Id. at 14.
Id.
Id at 22.
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The customer is still looking out for his own individual interests, and would
probably not go so far as to view his interests as "coextensive with the
interests of the overall relation."'
Turning to the attitude of planning for the future, in all transactions
there is a need to plan and account for the future, but given the
imperfections of human nature and thought, the relational model is correct
in highlighting that there is no possible way to account for every kind of
scenario that might turn up - hence, we need to be able to adjust
accordingly. Even with the "100 percent complete and binding planning"7 1
that the purely discrete contract model72 purports to do, it is fundamentally
impossible to absolutely prepare for every possible happening of the future,
no matter how many contingencies the discrete model attempts to account
for. On this note, the primitive relational contract model is accurate in
regards to its acknowledgement that "the difference in viewpoint is likely
to affect the way people respond to what the future actually brings."73
Finally, regarding the attitude towards "trouble" arising in contractual
relations, the appropriate attitude to take in any transaction is a mixture of
the discrete and the relational models' attitudes. We do not want to just
embrace that trouble will happen - i.e., embrace it so much that it
becomes a "normal aspect of life."74 Nor should we be blind to the
prospect of trouble, though. Rather, we should do as much as possible to
prevent future trouble, while preparing to face trouble, should it come
about.
B. THE RELEVANCE OF THE GOALS OF BOTH THE PURELY DISCRETE AND
THE PURELY RELATIONAL MODELS IN MODERN CONTRACTS

1. Incorporating More Dimensions of Human Experience
The very nature of human thought makes it impossible to have a
purely discrete or purely relational transaction. We do not think in purely
discrete nor purely relational terms.75 "Humans do think both discretely
and relationally at the same time, and thus think irrationally. 7 6 As Macneil
states, "[W]e are at the same time selfish individuals and integral parts of a

70. Id. at 18.
71. Id. at 19.
72. Such as the "neoclassical microeconomic model" that Macneil describes.
73. MACNEIL, supra note 1,at 19.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 12.
76. Id.
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social unity."77 In other words, from our nature as selfish creatures
operating in a cohesive society, it follows that both the goal of self-interest,
as represented by the pure discrete contract, and the goal of societal
cooperation, as represented by the pure relational contract, are at work in
all our transactions.
The nature of human thought, thus, is the source from which the goals
of contract are derived - and it is neither composed of purely self-interest
nor purely cooperation, but rather, a combination of both. A discretemodeled goal of self-interest and a relational-modeled goal of cooperation
are both relevant and crucial goals and understanding both of them as being
at the heart of contract allows for a broader understanding of ourselves as
humans beings - beings who value making rational choices calculated to
serve their individual interests (the model under the classical theory of
contract), and beings who also understand and value the rubric of care for
others (the model under the rational theory of contract).
2. Redefining "Choice" to Fit Both Discrete Self-Interest and
Relational Cooperation
Transactions are about choice. Choice is normally understood as
driven by self-interest, hence entering a voluntary contract, i.e., making a
choice to enter into an agreement with someone, is self-interest driven, as
the classical theory of contract, partnered with the discrete model of
contracts, argues. It is a rational calculation of the best ways to gain
economic benefits. However, there is another way of looking at choice,
which suggests that cooperation may also be driving choice in the contracts
context. Hadfield describes Elizabeth Anderson's concept of "rational
choice as expressive choice,"7 8 which is in line with this notion of choice as
being driven by both rationally weighed self-interest as well as an
allegiance to community, society, and cooperation-seeking:
[Elizabeth] Anderson's conception of rational choice captures a greater
share of the human experience without relinquishing rationality.
Indeed, she defines rationality as requiring the integration of emotion,
relation, and the possibility of growth into the process of valuing and
choosing among alternatives. Moreover, she recaptures for rationality
attributes of community and public meaning, releasing rationality from
its narrow confines within our separate skulls. 79

77. Id.
78. Hadfield, supra note 31, at 1262.
79. Id. at 1258.
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3. The Significance of the Goal of Cooperation and Society in
Contract
One may easily agree that a self-interest in economic benefits to
oneself is an undeniable goal of contract. We enter into a contract because
there is something the other party can do for us, which we want. This is the
seemingly self-evident proposition that the classical theory of contract
advances. And one may be willing to concede that parties seek to achieve
cooperation, but only as a means to an end - only as "instrumental"8 to
fulfilling the pursuit of those economic benefits, but not as an end in itself.
This article argues, however, that cooperation, like the fulfillment of selfinterest in economic benefits, is an end in itself in the realm of contract. To
understand this, we must first consider a broader assessment of the scope of
"cooperation."
To cooperate means to "work or act together."81 Hence, cooperation
entails interaction. Such interaction necessarily involves communication.
In entering into a contract, parties aim not only to obtain future benefits for
themselves, but also to deliver present communications to each other.
Consider Anderson's "expressive choice" theory, which Hadfield describes
in her essay.82 Anderson argues that in making a choice to enter into a
contract, a person's "promise-making"8 3 is not just a means to obtaining
future benefits but also an end in itself, an end of communicating, i.e.,
expressing, a message, as Hadfield describes in her assessment of
Anderson's theory:
Anderson's conception of rational choice as expressive choice can
endorse the idea that contracts are private orderings, but it disrupts the
judicial indifference to contractual consequences that follows in
conventional logic. For an expressive choice to enter into a contract
may spring not from an assessment of the value of future consequences,
but rather from a person's judgment that, in the present moment,
signing a given contract adequately expresses her valuation of a
situation, another person, or herself. She may not have pointed at a
particular good in the shop window because she judged it the best from
the array offered, but rather because respect for the shopkeeper or
disgust with herself required it. Thus, her choice may have been
findamentally an expression of her valuation of the present
circumstances and not an expression of her consequential assessment of
future options. She may have chosen to make a promise as an end in
itself rather than as an instrument to bring about some future state of
80. Id at 1262.
81. THE OXFORD DESK DICTIONARY AND THESAURUS: AMERICAN EDITION 160 (1997).

82. Hadfield, supra note 31, at 1262.
83. Id.
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This "valuation" of a situation is necessarily founded on cooperation
because the cooperation includes communication, and in expressing
valuation, one seeks to communicate one's individualized valuation. As
Hadfield writes:
Valuation and choice are rational, at least in part, because of their
relationship to a coherent understanding of ourselves and our
relationships to others.
Choices are not just about achieving
consequential goals, such
as income. They are about defining and
85
becoming who we are.
-

And with defining and becoming who we are in the agreements we
choose to make with others in society, we seek to simultaneously make a
communication to others of our self-definitions, which we achieve by our
choice-making. As Eric A. Posner asks in describing the kind of contact
and "networking ' 86 we engage in when conducting business activities,
which includes negotiating and entering into contracts, "... . what does such
contact consist of it not revealing information about oneself to others, and
obtaining information about them in return?"87 A possible counterargument to this thought is that the interest in communication - a form of
cooperation - is still instrumental to seeking out those economic benefits:
in defining ourselves and communicating our self-definitions to others, are
we not merely seeking to better position ourselves among others, and
within society, in order to reap the most economic benefits possible?
Maybe so. But an alternative argument can also be made, where our
relationship to society, as opposed to our interest in economic benefits, is
the end goal: it can be said that we are seeking to reap the most economic
benefits as a means to better positioning ourselves in relation to others, and
within society. These two interpretations precisely demonstrate that there
is an active interplay between the two notions - society (and the
cooperation with people) and self-interest (in economic benefits). This
interplay justifies the argument that both notions, as such, are goals of
contract, which exist together.
4. The Significance of the Goal of Self-Interest in Economic Benefits
in Contract
With all the discourse on the importance of recognizing society,
84. Id.
85. Id. at 1260.
86. Eric A. Posner, A Theory of Contract Law Under Conditionsof RadicalJudicialError,94 Nw.
U. L. REv. 755, 749 (1999-2000).
87. Id.
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cooperation, and relationships, one might wonder why the relational theory
of contract does not just sweep victory in the debate about what is at the
root of contract. This section discusses why the pursuit of economic
benefits should not be dismissed from the philosophical discourse of the
foundation of contract, notwithstanding the presence of society and
cooperation in that foundation.
As articulated previously, the importance of communication lends
support to the notion of society as one of the roots of contract. This "vision
of communication" comes from the relational theory of contract.88 But
something needs to supplement this vision of communication in the
contract context in order to set it apart from communication in the noncontract context. And what is this "something?" It is the self-interested
pursuit of economic benefits - and the principles of classical contract
theory that are associated with it. It is the formal rules that this
transactional self-interest produces - and within which the communication
occurs - that make that communication a contract and that make it
different from any other communication.
Macneil identifies "contract" as "relations among people who have
exchanged."89 He states that "[e]xperience has shown that the very idea of
contract as relations in which exchange occurs - rather than as specific
transactions, specific agreements, specific promises, specific exchanges,
and the like."9 ° Yes, the concept of contract is about relationships. But this
article argues that contract is both a relationship and a transaction. The
"exchange" is only an exchange because of a transaction, an agreement, a
promise. The idea is that there is something about the relationship, which
sets it apart from relationships generally. And that is the transactions in the
relationship. It is in the transactions discourse of contracts that we find the
self-interest in pursuing economic benefits. And it is in the relations
discourse of contracts that we find the pursuit of cooperation and
connection to society.
5. Contracts: A Mix of Business and Relationships
Law and economics scholars begin with the idea that we act in selfinterested, profit-maximizing ways9 ' in entering into contracts with other
88. Elizabeth Mertz, An Afterword: Tapping the Promise of Relational Contract Theory - "Real"
Legal Language and a New Legal Realism, 94 Nw. U. L. REv. 909, 934 (1999-2000).
89. Ian R. Macnell, Relational Contract Theory- Challenges and Queries, 94 Nw. U. L. REV. 877,
878 (2000).
90. Id.
91. Katharine T. Bartlett, Cracking Foundations as Feminist Method, 8 AM. U. J. GENDER Soc.
POL'Y & L. 31, 41 (2000).
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parties. It is clear, then, that self-interest, infused in the discrete contract
model, is one of the foundational blocks contract. But without society and
an attention to relationships, communication, and interaction - the
components of the relational contract model - there would be no contracts
at all. For a contract, by definition, needs more than one party. You cannot
contract alone, by yourself. Hence, society is the other foundational block
of contract. Business transactions, activity, contracts, are all about
relations with other parties, relations with society. Relationships are
essential. But we should not forget that self-interest is also an essential
element because it is what makes a relationship a "transaction"; economicbased self-interest is what makes the relationship different from regular
interactions with people and a community.
Posner illustrates this line of thought in his discussion of how business
activity is all about relationships. 92 He describes how "[p]arties to a
contract are almost never anonymous." 93 As such, fostering relationships
with each other becomes just as important and fundamental to the contract
as the transaction itself. This is illustrated by the fact that parties often are
extremely concerned about their own reputations and the reputations of
others. 94 This concern about relationships and reputations involves an
interest in "loyalty"95 and the spreading of good name to others in society:
In ordinary commercial contracts between merchants, both merchants
expect to do business with each other in the future, or at least with other
merchants who are likely to learn about the behavior of the parties.
Banks lend money to firms in the expectation that the firms will return
for credit in the future, an understanding often represented formally by
a revolving credit contract. Employers and workers understand that
employment contracts cannot describe all the behavior that will be
required on each side. Workers behave properly in order to obtain
bonuses and promotions and in order to avoid being penalized or fired.
Employers behave properly in order to maintain the loyalty of their
workers and to attract workers entering the market. Firms invest a vast
amount of money in making themselves known to consumers, so that if
a consumer has a satisfactory
experience he will come back, and he will
96
tell his friends about it.
We enter into contracts with parties who have good reputations, and
who are trustworthy, and entering into successful contracts with parties is
how such reputations and trustworthiness are further enhanced. Reputation
has everything to do with society, for it is about one's standing in society.
92. Posner, supra note 86, at 755.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 755-56. See Benjamin Klein & Klein B. Leffler, The Role of Market Forces in Assuring
ContractualPerformance, 89 J. POL. ECON. 615 (1981).
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Cooperating and engaging in successful contractual relationships amounts
to a good reputation. And this supports the notion of society, in addition to
the economic benefits we get from good business, as a foundational block
of contract.
Posner goes further by likening contracting parties to
"friends." 9 7 He illustrates how fostering these friendships becomes one of
the foundational blocks of entering into contracts with parties:
[P]arties spend a great deal of effort, time, and money trying to make
friends. A book publisher might take a client out to lunch or dinner.
Purchasing agents take suppliers to baseball games, plays and movies,
even to strip-tease joints. Business deals are everywhere forged in bars,
restaurants, and private drinking clubs. Business is almost always
conducted in a highly social manner. First, they talk about sports, then,
about their families; and only then, perhaps when the dinner or golf
game is almost over, do they shake hands on the deal.98
But again, they are different from the definition of "friends" generally
insofar as a transactionis involved. And it is in recognizing both (1) the
self-interest in pursuing economic benefits (most associated with
discreteness in contractual relations) and (2) the relational pursuit of a
cooperative society, that this distinction is preserved, making the realm of
contract a realm not solely about relationships nor solely about economic
benefits.
V. CONCLUSION

The discrete versus relational paradigms are not segregated concepts
after all, but rather, they are part of a single continuous "spectrum." 99 True,
particular transactions may fall closer to one end' 0 or another - one end
being where the purely discrete transaction lies and the other end
showcasing the purely relational transaction. But again, no transaction in
the real world can be entirely discrete nor entirely relational. Ultimately,
harmonizing the elements and goals of the relational model of contract with
those of discrete model of contract is to embrace a liberal-minded, forwardthinking view of the basis, motivations, and characteristics of contractual
relations in today's generation.
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